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Ever since the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co.,1 circumscribed copyright protection 
for factual compilations, courts have struggled to give content to 
Feist’s requirements.  The Feist Court held that, as a constitutional 
matter, copyright protects only compilations displaying “creative 
originality” in their selection or arrangement of facts and that the 
expenditure of effort—“sweat of the brow”—does not, in itself, 
merit protection.2  Since Feist, courts have sketched the contours 
 
1. 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991) (reaffirming the constitutional proscription against 
copyrighting facts).  In Feist, the Court emphasized that “originality is a constitutionally 
mandated prerequisite for copyright protection.”  Id. at 344-45 (“The most fundamental 
axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts that he 
narrates.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985)). 
2. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60 (“[O]riginality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touch-
stone of copyright protection . . . .”); see also Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone 
Pub. Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Hand, J.), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cited in 
Feist, 499 U.S. at 352-53 (identifying Jeweler’s Circular Pub. as the source of the “clas-
sic formulation” of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine of copyright). 
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of creatively original selection and arrangement, applying Feist’s 
directives to such compilations as a classified business directory, a 
New York City taxi drivers guide, a book of used car valuations, a 
numbers chart, and a yellow pages directory.  Courts also have at-
tempted to define the scope of the “thin” protection that Feist af-
fords compilations,3 and despite Feist’s flat rejection of the sweat 
of the brow approach, some courts persist in considering the com-
piler’s effort when determining whether a compilation is protected. 
The difficulties in applying Feist reflect the tension inherent in 
the Copyright Clause,4 which grants Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”5  This constitutional direc-
tive attempts to balance incentives to authors, thought to encourage 
the creation of new works in the short run, with public dissemina-
tion of previously created works, thought to promote progress in 
the long run.6  The tension between author control and public dis-
semination is especially strong in “fact-works,” which compile and 
present factual information, as compared with “works of fancy,” 
such as music, sculpture, and dance.7 
A decade before the Supreme Court decided Feist, Professor 
Gorman wrote that our law stresses the greater need to disseminate 
the contents of fact-works than the contents of works of fancy.8  As 
 
3. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5. Id. 
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (describing copyright as an area 
where “[t]he public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals”); see also 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the en-
gine of free expression.  By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 98-781, at 4 (1984) (“The congressional role . . . —as is made very clear in the text 
of the Constitution—is to define the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted 
a creator in order to give the public appropriate access to the creation.”). 
7. See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy?  The Implications for Copyright:  The 
Twelfth Annual Donald C. Bruce Memorial Lecture, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 560, 561 
(1982). 
8. See Gorman, supra note 7, at 561. 
POLIVY.TYP 9/29/2006  4:42 PM 
1998] COPYRIGHT FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS 777 
 
Gorman and others have pointed out, there is a strong public inter-
est in access to facts and a widespread belief that we need such ac-
cess to promote progress.9  First, facts are considered building 
blocks of intellectual activity that should remain in the public do-
main where they are freely available for use.10  In particular, the 
scientific community is committed to the free and unrestricted flow 
of data.11  Second, the expression in fact-works is often driven by 
and difficult to separate from the factual information itself.12  Be-
cause few varieties of expression are possible, similarities between 
fact-works may be considered non-infringing.13  Third, the First 
Amendment and the fair use provision in the Copyright Act14 ex-
pressly encourage free access to factual information to encourage 
commentary about social, political, and historical phenomena.15  
Depriving the public of free use of facts could interfere with the 
marketplace of ideas and hinder public discourse.16  Lastly, the au-
thor’s principal contribution to the creation of a fact-work may be 
“sweat”—expense, time, and effort.17  Collections of facts do not 
comport with a romantic notion of authorship;18 rather, fact-works 
are “personality-deprived.”19  To the extent that copyright is 
viewed as protecting works because they are rooted in or exten-
sions of authors’ personalities, fact-works will rarely qualify. 
These arguments for public dissemination, however, overlook 
the need to provide author-incentives to spur the creation of fact-
works.  The claim that the public’s strong interest in facts warrants 
reduced author control can be turned on its head; perhaps the util-
 
9. See id. at 562. 
10. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 
50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 76 (1997). 
11. See id. 
12. See Gorman, supra note 7, at 562. 
13. See id. 
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
15. See id. 
16. See Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607, 613-14 (1992). 
17. See Gorman, supra note 7, at 562. 
18. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 10, at 76. 
19. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright Protection 
of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg I]. 
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ity and importance of fact-works justify greater incentives for their 
creators.  Moreover, the First Amendment and fair use policies 
may provide sufficient access to facts to safeguard public dis-
course.  Additionally, Professor Ginsburg believes that the lack of 
romantic and expressive satisfaction in the creation of fact-works 
suggests that we need greater incentives for those works.20  Al-
though “some poets may toil for little more than fame,” those who 
create factual works probably do not.21  Lastly, some fact-works, 
such as computer databases, are commercially valuable.22  Failure 
to protect those works could retard the growth of the information 
industry, an increasingly important sector of the United States 
economy. 
This Article suggests that in applying Feist, courts have 
granted copyright protection to compilations that reflect the com-
pilers’ subjective, evaluative judgments, while reintroducing sweat 
of the brow under other guises.  Part I outlines the protection pro-
vided in the 1976 Copyright Act and previous statutes and de-
scribes the pre-1991 split among the circuit courts over the doc-
trines of creative selection and sweat of the brow.  Part II lays out 
the opinion in Feist, the landmark Supreme Court decision that re-
solved the circuit split in favor of “creative originality,” and ana-
lyzes the Feist opinion from constitutional, historical, and doctrinal 
perspectives.  Part III reviews the key factual compilation cases 
decided since Feist, analyzes how the courts have developed the 
creative originality doctrine, and further analyzes how courts, since 
Feist, have applied the doctrine of idea-expression merger to fac-
tual compilations and addressed the scope of protection for compi-
lations.  This Article concludes that, despite Feist’s insistence on 
“creative originality,” the lower courts still reward hard work, 
thereby maintaining author incentives—a core purpose of the 
 
20. See id. at 1908 (“Because many works whose production would enhance knowl-
edge may betray an authorship more plodding than inspired, . . . the works most in need 
of the copyright inducement are those in which personal authorship is least apparent.”). 
21. Id. 
22. See Bruce G. Joseph & David A. Vogel, Copyright Protection of Software and 
Compilations:  A Review of Critical Developments, 1991-1996, at 369, 479 (PLI Pats., 
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 441, 1991). 
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Copyright Clause. 
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS PRIOR 
TO 1991 
Since its inception, United States copyright law has protected 
factual compilations.  The courts, however, have disagreed about 
the basis for the protection of compilations.  Prior to Feist, the cir-
cuits were split between those subscribing to the creative selection 
doctrine and those applying the sweat of the brow approach, which 
protected the effort expended in creating compilations. 
A. Factual Compilations Under the Copyright Acts 
The first United States copyright act, the 1790 Copyright Act,23 
protected “maps, charts, and books.”24  Although the 1790 Copy-
right Act did not expressly name “compilations,” its protection of 
maps and charts evinces Congress’s intent to protect utilitarian col-
lections of information.  Early case law under the 1790 Copyright 
Act suggests that the constitutional framers intended to protect di-
rectories and other informational works.25  A high proportion of 
early copyright registrations was for works that presently would be 
considered compilations:  spelling books, atlases, collections of 
sermons, case reporters, and collections of state documents.26  The 
1909 Copyright Act protected compilations by listing “[b]ooks, in-
cluding composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, 
and other compilations” as the first class of work for which a copy-
right could be registered.27  It also stated that copyrights may be 
 
23. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1909). 
24. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 109, 116 (1991). 
25. See Jennifer R. Dowd, Note, A Selective View of History:  Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 34 B.C. L. REV. 137, 155 (1992). 
26. J.C. Gilreath, American Literature, Public Policy and the Copyright Laws be-
fore 1800, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, 1790-1800, at xii 
(1987), cited in Ralph Oman, Reflections on the Changing Shape of Database Protection:  
The Current State of Play, Policy Issues, and the International Context, 40 FED. B. NEWS 
& J. 232, 233 n.5 (1993). 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (repealed 1976). 
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secured for all the writings of an author28 and that the copyright in 
a work protects “all the copyrightable components of the work 
copyrighted.”29 
The 1976 Copyright Act expressly protects compilations, de-
fining them in section 101 as works “formed by the collection and 
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, co-
ordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a 
whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”30  The House of 
Representatives Report (“House Report”) that accompanied the 
1976 Copyright Act elaborated on the statutory definition, stating 
that “[a] ‘compilation’ results from a process of selecting, bringing 
together, organizing, and arranging previously existing material of 
all kinds, regardless of whether the individual items in the material 
have been or ever could have been subject to copyright.”31  Section 
102 of the 1976 Copyright Act states that copyright “subsists . . . in 
original works of authorship”32 and provides that copyright protec-
tion does not extend to discoveries.33  Section 103 explicitly states 
that the subject matter of copyright as specified in section 102 in-
cludes compilations,34 but limits protection to the material contrib-
uted by the author and denies protection for any preexisting mate-
rial used in the work.35 
B. Factual Compilation Case Law Before Feist 
Feist resolved a split in the circuits under the 1976 Copyright 
Act regarding the proper grounds for protecting factual compila-
tions.  The majority of circuits36 applied the “creative selection” 
 
28. Id. § 4. 
29. Id. § 3. 
30. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
31. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), quoted in Oman, supra note 26, at 233. 
32. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
33. Id. § 102(b). 
34. Id. § 103(a). 
35. Id. § 103(b). 
36. The Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits subscribed to the creative selec-
tion theory.  See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987); South-
western Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th 
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doctrine, protecting only the creative aspects of compilations.37  
The doctrine originated in the Trade-Mark Cases38 and Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,39 in which the Supreme Court 
held that originality is required for copyright protection.40  Courts 
applying the creative selection doctrine required works to show a 
minimal amount of creativity in the selection and arrangement of 
facts in order to qualify for copyright protection.  A compilation 
that was no more than a mechanical list of facts was not protected, 
even if considerable labor went into creating it.  If copyright ex-
isted, the facts in a compilation remained in the public domain.  
The creative selection approach ensured that future compilers 
could build on previously created factual compilations, so long as 
selection and arrangement were not borrowed.  This approach ar-
guably conferred a competitive advantage on subsequent compil-
ers, who did not have to collect facts but could “borrow” them 
from existing compilations.41 
The minority of circuits42 subscribed to the sweat of the brow 
theory, which protected the compiler’s labor expended in creating 
the compilation.43  The doctrine arose from early English cases in-
terpreting the Statute of Anne, Great Britain’s copyright statute, to 
prohibit second-comers from free riding on the labor of others.44  
United States courts linked the doctrine with the originality re-
 
Cir. 1985); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of 
Feist:  Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of 
Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1344 n.3 (1991). 
37. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1344. 
38. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
39. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
40. See Tracy Lea Meade, Note, Ex-Post Feist:  Applications of a Landmark Copy-
right Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 250 (1994). 
41. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1344. 
42. The Seventh, Eight, and Tenth Circuits followed the sweat of the brow theory.  
See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(mem.), rev’d, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 
1081 (7th Cir. 1990); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 
128 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Yen, supra note 36, at 1344 n.8. 
43. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1344. 
44. See Meade, supra note 40, at 248. 
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quirement by defining originality as independent creation.45  Under 
the sweat of the brow theory, courts granted full copyright protec-
tion if the compilation resulted from meaningful effort.  No matter 
how mechanical its selection and arrangement, every factual com-
pilation containing a large number of facts was protected.  Sweat 
of the brow courts prohibited future compilers from copying facts 
from protected compilations, effectively eliminating the competi-
tive advantage of second-comers.  Producers of subsequent com-
peting works were required to collect data anew, as if the first 
work did not exist.46 
II. FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO. 
“The Supreme Court dropped a bomb” with its decision in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,47 accord-
ing to Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman in his testimony before 
the House of Representatives.48  Likewise, Professor Goldstein de-
scribes Feist as a “landmark decision” and “a defining event for 
copyright in the information age.”49  Feist relied on the “bold and 
largely unprecedented premise” that creativity is part of copyright 
law’s originality requirement.50  A second extraordinary premise, 
that copyright’s originality requirement is constitutionally 
grounded, also underlay the decision.51  A third striking feature of 
the decision was its flat rejection of the sweat of the brow theory of 
copyright in favor of the creative selection approach favored by the 
 
45. See id. at 249. 
46. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1345. 
47. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
48. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 118. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 118.  Prior to Feist, most thought that outside the narrow area of photo-
graphs and art reproductions, “originality” meant no more than that the work had not 
been copied.  See id. at 118-19.  If a work had been independently created, as opposed to 
copied, and embodied a modicum of creative activity, the “originality” required in section 
102 had been satisfied.  See Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 331, 333 (1992) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT §2.01[A] (1991)). 
51. See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 119. 
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Second Circuit and others.52 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Rural Telephone Service Company (“Rural”), a certified public 
utility, supplied telephone service to several northwestern Kansas 
communities.53  Because it was the local telephone monopolist, 
Rural obtained subscriber information directly from the applica-
tions filed by residents who wanted telephone service.54  As a con-
dition of its monopoly franchise, Rural published an annual white 
and yellow pages telephone directory.55 
Feist Publications, Inc. (“Feist”), a publishing company, spe-
cialized in area-wide telephone directories.56  The 1983 directory at 
issue in the case spanned eleven different telephone service-areas 
in fifteen counties and contained 46,878 residential listings, com-
pared with Rural’s 7,700 listings.57  Because it was not a telephone 
company, Feist lacked independent access to subscriber informa-
tion and offered to pay the eleven phone companies in northwest-
ern Kansas for the right to use their white pages listings.58  Of the 
eleven, only Rural declined.59  Both Rural and Feist distributed 
their directories for free and competed “vigorously” for yellow 
pages advertisements.60 
In 1978, Feist used Rural’s listings without the telephone com-
pany’s consent.61  Feist removed several thousand listings that 
were outside the geographic range of its directory, sorted the re-
maining listings by town and alphabetized them, and sent the re-
 
52. See Raskind, supra note 50, at 332. 
53. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991). 
54. See id. at 343. 
55. See id. at 342. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. at 343. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. Kan. 
1987), aff’d, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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sulting lists to verifiers in each town.62  The verifiers checked 
every piece of information and sent corrections to Feist.63  Feist re-
peated this process in 1983, with the result that 1,309 of 46,878 
listings in Feist’s 1983 directory were identical to listings in Ru-
ral’s 1982-83 white pages.64  Those included four false listings Ru-
ral had inserted to detect copying.65 
Rural sued for copyright infringement, arguing that Feist could 
not use Rural’s white pages in compiling its own directory but 
must collect the data anew.66  Feist responded that conducting its 
own survey was economically impractical and also unnecessary 
because the listings it had copied were not protected by copy-
right.67  The district court granted summary judgment to Rural, cit-
ing numerous lower court decisions holding that telephone directo-
ries were copyrightable.68  In an unreported decision, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the district court.69 
B. Doctrinal Discussion and Application to the Facts 
Writing for all but Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the 
judgment but did not write an opinion, Justice O’Connor addressed 
the doctrinal tension posed by copyright law’s protection of factual 
compilations but not facts.70  Facts are not copyrightable, 
 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 343-44. 
65. See id. at 344. 
66. See id. 
67. See id.  Feist also entered a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending 
that Rural had violated the antitrust laws by trying to exclude it as a competitor in the 
market for yellow pages advertisements.  A United States District Court held that Rural’s 
refusal to license its listings was motivated by the unlawful purpose of extending its mo-
nopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in yellow pages advertising.  See Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610, 622 (D. Kan. 1990).  The Tenth 
Circuit later reversed the antitrust violation.  See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publica-
tions, Inc., 957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992). 
68. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. 
69. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 
1990) (mem), rev’d, 449 U.S. 340 (1991). 
70. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. 
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O’Connor explained, because facts are not original.71  Originality, 
which O’Connor termed the “sine qua non of copyright,” requires 
independent creation and a minimal degree of creativity.72  The re-
quired level of originality is so low that most works easily qual-
ify.73  Furthermore, originality does not signify novelty.74  Origi-
nality is necessary to trigger copyright protection because 
“[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.”75 
The Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to secure to “au-
thors” the exclusive right to their “writings” for a limited time.76  
In the Trade-Mark Cases and in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, the Court defined the crucial terms “authors” and “writ-
ings” to make it “unmistakably clear” that those terms presuppose 
originality.77  The Court addressed the constitutional scope of 
“writings” in the Trade-Mark Cases, establishing that originality—
which in turn requires independent creation “plus a modicum of 
creativity”—is required for a work to be classified as the writing of 
an author.78  In Burrow-Giles, the Court derived the same require-
ment from the Constitution’s use of the word “authors,” defining 
“author,” in the constitutional sense, as “he to whom anything 
owes its origin; originator; maker.”79  The Burrow-Giles Court also 
stressed the creative aspect of originality.80 
Because facts are not created—they do not owe their origin to 
an act of authorship—they are not original and hence are not pro-
tected by copyright.81  The distinction, according to O’Connor, is 
that between creation and discovery.82  The discoverer does no 
 
71. See id. at 345. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 346. 
76. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. Id. 
80. See id. at 346-47. 
81. See id. at 347. 
82. See id. 
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more than find information and copy it.83  For example, census tak-
ers do not create population figures, but copy those figures from 
the world around them.84  Because census data are not original in 
the constitutional sense, they are not protected.85  Likewise, facts, 
which are discovered, are not subject to copyright protection.86  
Factual compilations, in contrast, may possess sufficient originality 
and creativity in their selection and arrangement of facts to deserve 
copyright protection.87 
Justice O’Connor emphasized that, although fact compilations 
may be protected, their protection is “thin.”88  Copyright extends 
only to aspects of the work that are original to the author, which 
may include written expression surrounding the facts or, where 
facts stand alone, their selection and arrangement.89  Later compil-
ers may freely use the facts contained in an earlier compilation as 
long as they do not appropriate the first work’s selection and ar-
rangement.90  According to O’Connor, it is not unfair that others 
may freely use the fruit of a compiler’s labor because encouraging 
others to build freely upon the ideas and information in existing 
works “is the means by which copyright advances the progress of 
science and art.”91  Promoting progress, not rewarding labor, is the 
primary objective of copyright.92 
Next, Justice O’Connor reviewed the history of the originality 
requirement and its treatment in the 1909 Copyright Act.  The 
Court’s decisions announcing that originality is a constitutional 
mandate predate the 1909 Copyright Act, but ambiguous language 
in the statute caused some lower courts to ignore the originality re-
 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 348. 
88. Id. at 349. 
89. See id. at 348. 
90. See id. at 349. 
91. Id. at 350. 
92. See id. at 349. 
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quirement.93  The 1909 Copyright Act did not expressly require 
originality.  Instead, section 4 of the act stated that copyright pro-
tects “all the writings of an author,” and the words “writing” and 
“author” implicitly incorporated the originality requirements ar-
ticulated in the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrows-Giles.94  Section 3 
stated that only the copyrightable parts of a work were protected, 
but did not identify originality as the characteristic that determined 
which parts were copyrightable.95  The implicit rather than explicit 
incorporation of the originality requirement led some courts to 
err.96  Furthermore, section 5 mentioned compilations as copy-
rightable works, and some courts mistook this to mean that compi-
lations were copyrightable per se.97 
Misunderstanding the 1909 Copyright Act and led astray by 
section 5’s mention of compilations as copyrightable, some courts 
created the sweat of the brow theory.98  The most glaring flaw of 
this doctrine, according to O’Connor, was that it extended protec-
tion in compilations to the facts themselves, ignoring the “funda-
mental axiom” that no one may copyright facts.99  O’Connor as-
serted that copyright law has historically acknowledged a greater 
need to disseminate factual works than to disseminate fictional 
works or other works of fancy.100  Consequently, the sweat of the 
brow theory contravened basic copyright principles.101 
The Copyright Act of 1976102 incorporated changes expressly 
designed to clear up uncertainty in the lower courts regarding basic 
copyright standards, including the originality requirement.103  
 
93. See id. at 351. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 351-52. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 352-53. 
99. See id. at 353. 
100. See id. at 354. 
101. See id. 
102. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1010 (1994)). 
103. See id. at 355. 
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Congress dropped the term “all the writings of an author,” replac-
ing it with “original works of authorship” in section 102(a).104  The 
legislative history makes clear that Congress purposely left “origi-
nal works of authorship” undefined to incorporate without change 
the originality standard established by the courts under the 1909 
Copyright Act.105  In addition, section 102(b), which lists the ele-
ments of a work that cannot be copyrighted,106 replaced the former 
section 3, which had stated that copyright protected only the copy-
rightable parts of a work but had not named those parts.107  Fur-
thermore, Congress defined “compilation” in section 101,108 and 
clearly stated in section 103 that protection does not reach the facts 
themselves.109 
The 1976 Copyright Act imposes three distinct requirements 
for a compilation to receive copyright protection:  the collection 
and assembly of pre-existing information; the selection, coordina-
tion, or arrangement of those materials; and the creation, as a result 
of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an 
original work of authorship.110  The first requirement is not infor-
mative.111  The third stresses the originality requirement.112  The 
second is the key; it directs courts to focus on the manner in which 
collected facts are selected, coordinated, and arranged in deciding 
whether a fact work is an original work of authorship.113  The 
originality requirement is not stringent, but asks only that the au-
thor independently devise a selection or arrangement that displays 
a minimal degree of creativity.114  Most works will satisfy this re-
quirement, but not “the narrow category of works in which the 
 
104. See id. 
105. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) and S. REP. NO. 94-473, 
at 50 (1975)). 
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
107. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
111. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 357 (1991). 
112. See id. 
113. See id. at 358. 
114. See id. 
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creative spark is so utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent.”115  Furthermore, protected works receive only limited 
protection because copyright does not reach the pre-existing mate-
rial.116 
Applying the doctrine to the facts, Justice O’Connor reiterated 
that the issue before the Court was whether Feist had infringed Ru-
ral’s copyright.117  Because Feist did not contest Rural’s copyright 
in its directory, the Court asked whether Rural had proven the sec-
ond element of infringement by establishing that Feist had copied 
material that was “original” to Rural.118  The raw subscriber infor-
mation copied was not original.119  Furthermore, Rural had not se-
lected, coordinated, or arranged the raw data in an original way.120  
Rural’s white pages were “typical” and “garden-variety” and de-
void of even the slightest trace of creativity.121  Rural’s selection, 
in publishing every subscriber’s name, town, and telephone num-
ber, was “obvious.”122  The white pages’ alphabetical organization 
of names was no more creative than their selection and, therefore, 
was unoriginal.123 
As a constitutional matter, Rural’s white pages did not possess 
the creative spark that the Constitution requires for protection.124  
As a statutory matter, similarly, Rural’s white pages lacked the 
originality required for Copyright Protection under the 1976 Copy-
 
115. Id. at 358-59. 
116. See id. at 359. 
117. See id. at 361. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. at 362. 
121. See id. 
122. See id.  Rural’s selection may also fail the originality requirement, Justice 
O’Connor noted, because, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, it did not truly “se-
lect” to publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers but was required to 
do so by the Kansas Corporation Commission.  Id. at 363. 
123. See id.  According to the court, alphabetical arrangement is “an age-old prac-
tice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a 
matter of course.  It is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable.”  Id. 
124. See id. 
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right Act.125  Because the white pages were not protected, Feist’s 
use of Rural’s listings was not infringement.126  In closing, the 
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.127 
C. Analysis of the Feist Opinion:  Three Perspectives 
As a landmark Supreme Court decision, Feist has been the sub-
ject of much commentary.  This section examines the opinion from 
constitutional, historical, and doctrinal perspectives. 
1. Congress’s Authority Questioned 
Feist’s assertion that copyright’s originality requirement is 
constitutionally grounded raises questions about the scope of con-
gressional authority to protect factual compilations both under and 
outside of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause.  First, O’Connor’s 
repeated invocation of the Constitution as the source of the creative 
originality requirement challenges Congress’s authority to imple-
ment and lend its own construction to the Copyright Clause.  Feist 
construes both “author” and “writing” in the Copyright Clause to 
demand creativity.128  Professor Ginsburg, however, argues that 
regardless of the Supreme Court’s previous interpretations of those 
terms, Congress may interpret the clause as it chooses.129  More-
over, the Court should review congressional findings deferen-
tially.130 
Professor Ginsburg contrasts the Feist court’s “textual exege-
sis” of the Copyright Clause with the Court’s lack of concern, in 
recent years, over articulating and enforcing internal limits inher-
 
125. Id. at 363-64. 
126. Id. 
127. See id. 
128. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
129. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?  Copyright and Other Protection of Works 
of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 375 (1992) [here-
inafter Ginsburg II] (“Congress’ determination of what endeavors constitute the ‘Writ-
ings’ of ‘Authors’ should be viewed as an exercise in fact-finding by the body most com-
petent to evaluate the efficacy of the means chosen to promote the constitutional goal.”). 
130. See id. 
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ent in Article I grants of power.131  Moreover, legislative precedent 
supports broad congressional power to interpret the key terms of 
the Patent-Copyright Clause.132  For example, in the Plant Patent 
Act,133 Congress buttressed its determination that finders of new 
plant varieties could be considered “inventors” by stating that it 
would not expect the courts to impede the progress of science and 
the useful arts by insisting on such a narrow definition of the word 
“inventor” as to decide that the Plant Patent Act exceeded Con-
gress’s authority.134 
Professor Ginsburg’s view of Congress’s role is grounded in 
her belief that the judicial branch is poorly suited to determine 
what constitutes knowledge and how its progress should be en-
couraged.135  Instead, Ginsburg claims that determining whether a 
given work is the “writing” of an “author” is best made by Con-
gress, which can investigate the factual basis for a claim and will 
be aware of the economic and policy implications of including or 
excluding a particular type of work.136 
Congress, unlike the judiciary, is subject to direct political and 
economic pressure to protect and reward certain sectors of the 
economy.  If not constrained by judicial interpretations of the 
Copyright Clause, Congress may be unwilling to balance impar-
tially the competing interests of public dissemination and author 
incentives.  The economically powerful information industry will 
lobby forcefully for increased protection.  Those interest groups 
likely to favor public dissemination—libraries, schools, and re-
 
131. See id. at 376 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
297 (2d. ed. 1988)).  For example, in a 1972 patent case, the Court showed great defer-
ence to Congress’s construction of the clause, stating that “[t]he direction of Art[icle] I is 
that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.  
When . . . the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go 
can come only from Congress.”  Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 
406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)). 
132. See id. 
133. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
161 (1994)). 
134. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 376-77. 
135. See id. at 378. 
136. See id. at 380-81. 
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search foundations—lack comparable economic power.  Conse-
quently, Congress’s fact-finding may not be impartial, and its de-
termination that a given work is the “writing” of an “author” may 
represent a political decision, rather than an informed policy judg-
ment.137  The courts, which are not subject to direct political and 
economic pressure, are better suited to effect a wise balance be-
tween public dissemination and protection. 
Of course, Congress could try to circumvent constitutional 
limitations on its power to interpret the Copyright Clause by enact-
ing statutory protection for compilations under the Commerce 
Clause.  O’Connor’s reliance on the Constitution, however, also 
raises questions about Congress’s authority to protect compilations 
even under the Commerce Clause.  The Court could hold that the 
more specific clauses of the Constitution limit the more general.138  
The contrary position—that the more specific clauses illustrate the 
more general powers—may be foreclosed in the context of the Pat-
ent-Copyright Clause because the Court has already described that 
clause as both a grant of power and a limitation.139 
2. Did Feist Mischaracterize History? 
The Feist Court may have misapplied prior Supreme Court 
constructions of the Copyright Clause.140  One scholar suggests 
that Feist misconstrued history by ignoring the fact that, from the 
enactment of the Constitution through the Trade-Mark Cases in 
1879, an entire body of case law and secondary sources construed 
“originality” merely to require independent creation.141  Courts 
protected, and commentators contemplated protecting, directories 
and other informational works based on the labor expended.142  
 
137. It is likely that members of Congress will be more receptive to the message 
delivered by economically powerful publishers in favor of protection than to that deliv-
ered by librarians and public interest representatives—who cannot make large political 
action committee contributions—in favor of public dissemination. 
138. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 370. 
139. See id. at 370 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
140. See id. at 374. 
141. See Dowd, supra note 25, at 154-55. 
142. See id. at 155. 
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Additionally, Feist disregarded the English precedent, which 
stressed protection for independently created informational works, 
on which United States copyright law was based.143 
Furthermore, the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles do not 
clearly support the contention that the Constitution limits copyright 
protection to original works.144  In the Trade-Mark Cases, which 
concerned the constitutionality of federal trademark legislation, the 
Court interpreted “writings,” as used in the Copyright Clause, as 
merely a comparison to trademark law.  The Court did not interpret 
“writings” to elucidate what copyright law protected, but rather to 
show what trademark law did not protect.145  The “intellectual la-
bor” required of a “writing” in the Trade-Mark Cases might be sat-
isfied by the assembly of information into a compilation, whether 
or not the information was creatively selected or arranged.146  Bur-
row-Giles addressed whether the framers meant to limit copyright 
protection to literary works.147  The “author” at the “origin” of a 
work, under Burrow-Giles, could include the maker of an informa-
tion compilation, without regard to the compilation’s creativity.148  
Moreover, neither decision addressed the scope of copyright pro-
tection.  Consequently, these decisions do not support constitution-
ally restricting copyright infringement claims to the copying of au-
thors’ “original” contributions.149  In fact, other cases decided early 
in the twentieth century indicate that courts perceived no such limi-
tation on acts constituting infringement.150 
3. Social Benefits, Cost Recoupment, Creative 
Originality, and Sweat of the Brow 
Ideally, copyright law would encourage compilers to create so-
 
143. See id. at 142, 154. 
144. See id. at 155-56. 
145. See id. at 156. 
146. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 374. 
147. See Dowd, supra note 25, at 156. 
148. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 374. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. at 375. 
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cially beneficial compilations that would not be produced without 
copyright protection.  In affirming creative originality rather than 
sweat of the brow as the basis for copyright protection, the Feist 
Court chose the doctrine that best approximates the ideal.  Creative 
originality encourages compilers to enhance information that al-
ready is in the public domain.  The sweat of the brow doctrine, in 
contrast, helps compilers recoup their costs but does not expressly 
encourage the creation of useful compilations. 
i. Social Benefits 
The Constitution directs that copyright law promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.  To achieve this result, doc-
trines that confer and circumscribe copyright protection should, as 
a policy matter, encourage the creation of socially beneficial 
works.151 
One difficulty with the social benefit rationale is that it justifies 
protection with respect to an overall system of production but can-
not easily be applied to individual works.152  Applying a social 
benefit rule on a case-by-case basis would require judges to deter-
mine the social value of individual compilations, a role inappropri-
ate for judges in copyright law.153  Even if courts could articulate 
criteria for ruling on compilations’ social value, judges are unlikely 
to apply these criteria consistently from court to court.154  In fact, 
judges may be unable to do so, as criteria of social worth may vary 
from one locale to another.155 
Furthermore, a social benefit rationale would require courts to 
 
151. See Ginsburg I, supra note 19, at 1899 (citing Robert A. Gorman, Copyright 
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1603 
(1963)). 
152. See id. 
153. See id. at 1899-1900.  Justice Holmes stated that, “[I]t would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of [works], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”  Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
154. See Ginsburg I, supra note 19, at 1900. 
155. See id. 
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assess the potential social worth of a second-comer’s work, which 
might or might not be considered infringing depending on whether 
the first-comer’s work is protected.  For example, a court faced 
with the facts in Feist would need to compare the social benefits 
conferred by Rural’s white page directory with the benefits of 
Feist’s area-wide directory.  Each offered different social benefits.  
How should a court compare the value of a limited, easy-to-use 
white pages directory to an elderly rural resident of northwestern 
Kansas with the value of a comprehensive directory to a business 
located in the nearest urban area?  Taking the matter one step fur-
ther, the social benefit approach would also require courts to con-
sider the potential social benefits of future compilations that a sec-
ond-comer might or might not choose to create, depending on 
whether the first work was protected. 
ii. Cost Recoupment 
According to the social benefit rationale, copyright should en-
courage the production of useful works that might not be created 
without copyright protection because their costs could not be re-
couped.156  With respect to cost recoupment, Professor Yen claims 
that factual compilations share the characteristics of public 
goods.157  Numerous people can use them without impairing oth-
ers’ use (“non-rivalrous consumption”), and those who do not pay 
cannot easily be prevented from using them (absence of “exclud-
ability”).158  These characteristics suggest that, as with other public 
goods, the supply of factual compilations produced by the free 
market will fall short of society’s needs.159  Developers will pro-
duce compilations only to the extent that they can recoup their 
costs, and free riding interferes with such recoupment.160 
Compilation developers can recoup their costs by selling the 
 
156. See id. at 1899. 
157. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1368. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
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information they compile.161  A second-comer who wants to un-
dercut the original developer can buy a copy of the first compila-
tion and incur only the marginal costs of making and distributing 
copies.  As Yen points out, however, original compilers can recoup 
their costs in other ways besides selling information, such as using 
the information as a loss-leader to increase sales of other products 
and services, recouping some costs from sponsoring government or 
non-profit organizations, and exploiting the natural monopoly that 
follows initial publication of the data.162  Other cost recoupment 
tactics include charging parties for inclusion of their information in 
the compilation and discriminating in the prices charged to differ-
ent customers.163  These possibilities for cost recoupment suggest 
that some compilations will be developed even if copyright law 
does not confer a natural monopoly on the developers.164  Because 
adequate incentives exist for these compilations, there is no good 
policy reason for extending copyright protection to them, and the 
public’s interest in dissemination of information dictates that they 
should not be protected. 
A cost recoupment rule would be no easier to apply than a so-
cial benefit rationale.  What, exactly, would be the nature of the 
judicial inquiry?  Under a per se rule, costs for certain types of 
compilations would be deemed per se unrecoverable.  Alterna-
tively, under a rule of reason analysis, analogous to that used in an-
titrust law,165 compilations that do not meet the per se rule’s re-
quirements would be subject to a factual investigation to determine 
whether their costs were in fact recouped.  A factual analysis 
would require courts to separate cases of “legitimate” failure to re-
coup costs, i.e., useful compilations heavily used by free riders, 
 
161. See id. at 1369. 
162. See id. at 1369-71.  If the data are time-sensitive, the first-comer’s natural mo-
nopoly will confer a large advantage.  See id. at 1371.  Furthermore, the first-comer can 
lengthen the natural monopoly by discouraging potential free riders through tactics such 
as regular printing of updates and, in the case of computer databases, charging for copy-
ing or downloading.  See id. at 1371-72. 
163. See id. at 1372. 
164. See id. at 1374. 
165. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
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from those where the failure to recoup costs was caused by mis-
management and poor marketing.  It is difficult to see what end 
would be served by asking courts to make such determinations. 
iii. Creative Originality 
From a policy perspective, the ideal doctrine would protect so-
cially beneficial compilations that would not be produced absent 
the guarantee of cost recoupment offered by copyright protection.  
Feist’s creative originality doctrine serves as a good proxy for a 
social benefits rule.  Its originality requirement insists that a com-
pilation offer something new, that is, something original, to the 
world.  By requiring compilations to display a “modicum of crea-
tivity,” Feist ensures that compilers will build upon and not simply 
rehash pre-existing public domain information.  Because facts are 
not protected, compilers are encouraged creatively to select and ar-
range factual information and to add their subjective judgments to 
facts in order to ensure protection.  The doctrine of creative origi-
nality thus promotes progress by spurring compilers to enhance 
public domain information.  On a case-by-case basis, creative 
originality may protect some arguably unimportant works and may 
not protect some undeniably useful works.  The aggregate effect of 
the doctrine, however, is to encourage compilers to contribute to 
the store of knowledge in the world.  Meanwhile, by limiting pro-
tection to compilations displaying a modicum of creativity, the 
doctrine promotes progress by allowing compilers to use freely any 
material that does not meet Feist’s threshold originality require-
ment. 
Professor Ginsburg agrees that Feist may impel compilers to 
add value in the form of subjective information to their compila-
tions.166  If a compilation includes all the information in a given 
universe, a court might consider the choice of a universe to be an 
idea and therefore unprotectable under the merger doctrine,167 be-
 
166. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 347. 
167. For a detailed case analysis of the merger doctrine, see infra notes 317-53 and 
accompanying text. 
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cause protecting the selection of a universe would preclude others 
from creating compilations about that universe.168  To ensure pro-
tection of an exhaustive compilation, Professor Ginsburg suggests 
that the compiler will add complementary and subjective informa-
tion to the basic data, so that a court will be likely to find creative 
selection in the resulting compilation.169  The addition of subjec-
tive information, however, will raise the cost of producing the 
compilation, and the developer will pass the increased cost onto 
users.170  To the extent that users do not value the additional in-
formation enough to warrant the increased cost of access, their use 
of the compilation will decrease.171 
Professor Ginsburg’s objection actually highlights an advan-
tage of the creative originality doctrine:  the likelihood that it will 
encourage compilation developers to add value, in the form of op-
tional and subjective information, to factual compilations.  Gins-
burg herself uses the term “value added” to refer to the possibly 
unnecessary and expensive information that compilers will add.172  
With respect to increased costs and reduced access, it is likely that 
the marginal cost of adding information to a compilation is small, 
relative to the fixed cost of developing a compilation in the first 
place.  Consumers who do not want the enhanced information can 
ignore it.  The popularity of consumer publications offering ratings 
and rankings of cities, schools, restaurants, and mutual funds, to 
name just a few categories, suggests strong consumer demand for 
exactly this sort of enhanced information. 
Although creative originality provides a good proxy for a so-
cial benefits rule, as Professor Yen points out, it is not positively 
correlated with an inability to recoup costs.173  Yen writes that 
“[t]here is simply nothing to suggest that creative selection or ar-
rangement of facts is positively correlated with the absence of gov-
 
168. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 347. 
169. See id. at 347. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
173. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1374. 
POLIVY.TYP 9/29/2006  4:42 PM 
1998] COPYRIGHT FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS 799 
 
ernment subsidy, nonprofit motives, low development costs, high 
sales volume, or natural monopolies.”174  All of these conditions 
are as likely to exist for uncreative as for creative compilations.  
Thus in Yen’s view, Feist does not necessarily protect compila-
tions that, from a cost recoupment perspective, need protection. 
Although Professor Yen may be correct that creativity is not 
correlated with inability to recoup costs, nothing suggests that the 
latter is positively correlated with a compilation’s contribution to 
the progress of science and the useful arts.  In fact, an inverse cor-
relation is more likely.  Arguably, a compilation’s ability to recoup 
costs signals that the marketplace places a high value on a compi-
lation.  The existence of some free riding does not mean that mar-
ketplace signals are worthless.175 
With respect to ease of application, creative originality allows 
judges to assess compilations according to a set of “objective” 
characteristics, rather than requiring them to make value judgments 
about compilations’ worth or complex economic evaluations of 
cost-recoverability.  Although courts may differ as to what exactly 
is “creative,” determination of creativity lends itself to case-by-
case factual comparisons, and courts can use other compilation 
cases as guideposts.  Different types of compilations can be com-
pared along two dimensions:  creative selection and creative ar-
rangement.  In contrast, evaluation of the social worth or cost re-
covery potential of a compilation requires a stand-alone assessment 
of the work.  Inter-work comparisons, except within narrow cate-
gories of similar compilations, will not be useful because each 
compilation may offer a different type of social benefit or pose a 
different set of cost-recoupment difficulties. 
Professor Raskind criticizes creative originality because it ig-
nores the subjective and creative judgments inherent in the activity 
of collecting data for a compilation.176  Rewarding creativity in the 
 
174. Id. 
175. For example, the fact that law students may offer their friends and relatives the 
use of their free Westlaw and Lexis passwords does not prevent law firms from paying 
large sums in order to use those services. 
176. See Raskind, supra note 50, at 336.  Professor Raskind illustrates his charge 
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activity of data collection, however, is inconsistent with promoting 
progress.  Creative data collection is not socially valuable in itself; 
it is the result of that collection that may be valuable.  If the crea-
tivity inherent in the data collection method reduces the cost of 
preparing the compilation, then, from a policy perspective, protec-
tion becomes less desirable because the compiler is more likely to 
recoup the lowered costs.  If creative data collection results in a 
minimally creative product, then the compilation will be protected.  
Rewarding the creativity inherent in the collection process focuses 
not on the compilation produced but on the compiler’s effort in 
producing it, as did the sweat of the brow doctrine rejected in 
Feist. 
iv. Sweat of the Brow 
The sweat of the brow doctrine is less likely to protect socially 
beneficial compilations than Feist’s creative originality approach.  
Although the latter allows compilers to build upon others’ work 
and encourages them to contribute something new in order to ob-
tain protection, the sweat of the brow approach prevents compilers 
from building upon pre-existing compilations and provides no in-
centive for creative as opposed to merely laborious effort.  On a 
case-by-case basis, sweat of the brow might protect many useful 
works.  In the aggregate, however, it would impede progress by re-
quiring compilers to continually collect raw data anew. 
With respect to cost recoupment, sweat of the brow is more 
likely than creative originality to protect compilations, the costs of 
which might not otherwise be recouped.  Compilers who expend 
significant effort probably incur high development costs that they 
may be unable to recoup.  Cost recoupment in itself, however, is 
 
with Feist’s census-taking example.  If taking the census is mere copying of information 
from the world, he asks, why do some dispute the accuracy of the census in large cities?  
See id.  Professor Raskind confuses the data collected with disputes about its accuracy.  
Critics of urban census counts do not attack census-takers’ subjective judgments but 
rather question the correctness and comprehensiveness of the data, alleging that certain 
groups are undercounted because census-takers are reluctant to enter crime-ridden neigh-
borhoods and cannot easily count the homeless. 
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not a goal of copyright policy unless protecting the compilations at 
issue also promotes progress in some way.  Thus the choice be-
tween creative originality and sweat of the brow can be character-
ized as a choice between, on the one hand, encouraging the crea-
tion of useful compilations and the free use of pre-existing material 
while not guaranteeing cost recoupment, and, on the other hand, 
ensuring that significant investments in compilation efforts will be 
recovered while not expressly encouraging the creation of useful 
compilations or the free use of existing material. 
Given this tradeoff, it is evident that the Feist Court made the 
correct choice.  As between the social benefit and cost recoupment 
rationales, cost recoupment is the more easily sacrificed of the two.  
As discussed above, compilers may recoup their costs even without 
copyright protection.  Therefore, the fact that Feist denies protec-
tion to purely factual works that do not meet its minimal creativity 
requirement does not condemn those works.  In effect, the aspect 
of the creative originality doctrine that might seem to discourage, 
rather than encourage, the creation of useful factual works is not 
fatal to their creation.  In contrast, the sweat of the brow doctrine’s 
flat insistence that second-comers must proceed as if other works 
did not exist177 is unquestionably fatal to the type of progress com-
pilers can achieve by building on predecessor works.  Conse-
quently, the doctrine of creative originality promotes progress 
more fully than the sweat of the brow approach. 
Furthermore, the sweat of the brow doctrine actually may keep 
development costs high by promoting inefficiency and encourag-
ing the use of old, labor-intensive methods rather than new tech-
nology.  If copyright rewards significant expenditures of effort, 
compilers will be sure to expend considerable effort to guarantee 
protection.  As a result, added costs will be passed on to consum-
ers, whose use of those works may drop.  If copyright does not re-
ward sweat, compilers will use the most efficient and inexpensive 
means possible to create compilations, because they will not be 
guaranteed cost-recovery.  The resulting lower cost to consumers 
 
177. See Yen, supra note 36, at 1345. 
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will encourage greater use. 
III. FACTUAL COMPILATION CASE LAW AFTER FEIST 
Courts applying Feist have added content to the concepts of 
creative selection and arrangement and further delineated the scope 
of protection for compilations.  Additionally, two cases have sug-
gested an approach to idea/expression merger in factual compila-
tions, an issue not addressed in Feist.  Lastly, several decisions 
suggest that the sweat of the brow doctrine is not dead, and that 
courts will not hesitate to introduce it in other guises. 
A. Creative Selection 
Since Feist, more courts have analyzed creative selection than 
any other aspect of compilation copyright protection.  Courts find 
creative originality in selections that reflect the compiler’s subjec-
tive judgment and personal knowledge and experience and that are 
not obvious in the underlying data.  In contrast, selections deter-
mined by convention, industry standards, or other strictly utilitar-
ian criteria are not creatively original. 
1. Cases in Which Selections Were Held to be Creative 
Seven months after Feist, in Key Publications, Inc. v. China-
town Today Publishing Enterprises,178 the Second Circuit found 
creativity in Key Publications’ (“Key”) selection of businesses of 
interest to New York City’s Chinese-American community and its 
exclusion of businesses unlikely to survive for long.179  A second 
directory that copied a subset of Key’s directory, however, was 
held not to infringe on Key’s selection because the two directories 
employed significantly different selection principles.180 
Key published an annual classified business directory for New 
York City’s Chinese-American community.181  Key’s president, 
 
178. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991). 
179. See id. at 513. 
180. See id. at 515-16. 
181. See id. at 511. 
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Lynn Wang (“Wang”), created the directory by collecting business 
cards from professionals and businesses, and copying what the dis-
trict court termed a “modest percentage” of listings from an earlier 
directory.182  Wang placed each of the listings, which exceeded 
9,000 in number, in one of more than 260 business categories.183  
Galore Enterprises, Inc. (“Galore”), the alleged infringor, pub-
lished a competing classified directory for the New York Chinese-
American community.184  Galore’s yellow pages contained about 
2,000 listings grouped into 28 categories.185  About 75% of the 
businesses listed in Galore’s directory were also in Key’s.186 
Galore appealed the district court’s holding that its publication 
infringed Key’s copyright in its directory.187  Affirming the district 
court on copyrightability but reversing on infringement, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that Key’s directory was subject to copyright but 
that Galore’s book did not infringe.188 
Analyzing the copyrightability of Key’s directory, Judge Win-
ter stated that “[s]election implies the exercise of judgment in 
choosing which facts from a given body of data to include in a 
compilation.”189  Although Galore claimed that Wang had “slav-
ishly” included every business about which she had obtained in-
formation, the record supported the district court’s conclusion that 
Wang’s selection was sufficiently original.190  Specifically, 
Wang’s testimony that she excluded businesses she did not think 
would remain open very long showed thought and creativity in se-
lection.191  Galore also argued that, because some of the listings in 
the Key directory had been printed in the earlier Restaurant Direc-
 
182. Id. 
183. See id. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. at 510-11. 
188. See id. at 514, 515-16. 
189. Id. at 513  
190. Id. 
191. See id. 
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tory, the court should not find originality.192  The court rejected 
this claim because the selection in the Key directory “was not cop-
ied wholesale” from the earlier guide.193 
In Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co.,194 de-
cided shortly after Key Publications, the district court for the East-
ern District of New York held that the selections of both street ad-
dress listings and out-of-town destinations in a New York City 
taxi-driver’s guide were copyrightable.195  The street address sec-
tion of Nester’s Official New York Taxi Driver’s Guide listed all 
the major concourses in New York City.196  Instead of listing all 
the cross streets, the guide listed only those that its author, Lewis 
Nester (“Nester”), considered the most important and helpful, 
based upon his knowledge of New York.197  The guide assigned 
approximate, not actual, street address numbers to the cross 
streets.198  Hagstrom Map Co. (“Hagstrom”), which published a 
competing taxi-driver’s guide, admitted copying from Nester’s 
guide but claimed that the material taken was factual and, there-
fore, not copyrightable.199  In response, Nester claimed that be-
cause the street address numbers were invented, they were not 
facts but should be protected like other fictional works.200  The 
court refused to treat the addresses as fiction but held that they 
were protected because of the originality used in selecting and as-
signing them.201  Specifically, Nester had shown creativity in as-
signing approximate numbers to building addresses at the chosen 
intersections.202 
Besides its street address section, Nester’s publication included 
 
192. See id. 
193. Id. 
194. 796 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
195. Id. at 733. 
196. See id. at 732. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. at 733. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. 
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a mileage rate guide that contained the mileage from 59th Street 
and Columbus Circle to various locations outside of New York 
City.203  The court determined that Nester’s selection of particular 
destinations was protected because it rested upon his knowledge 
and judgment as to their usefulness to a taxi-driver.204 
In CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market 
Reports,205 the next compilation case to reach the Second Circuit, 
the court held that a selection of used car valuations was suffi-
ciently original to warrant copyright protection.206  Maclean 
Hunter Market Reports (“Maclean Hunter”) published the Auto-
mobile Red Book—Official Used Care Valuations (“Red Book”) 
eight times a year in different versions for each of three regions of 
the United States.207  Each issue presented the next six weeks’ pro-
jected values of “average” models of most of the used cars, seven 
years old and under, sold in that region.208  The Red Book pre-
sented the predicted values separately for each make, model, body 
style, and engine type, with adjustments for options and for mile-
age in 5,000 mile increments.209  Maclean Hunter’s editors as-
signed the valuations based on a range of sources and their own 
professional experience.210  CCC Information Services, Inc. 
(“CCC”) also provided its customers with valuation information 
about used vehicles, but through a computer database rather than a 
book.211  For several years, CCC had loaded large portions of the 
Red Book onto its computer network and made the Red Book data 
available to its customers.212  CCC requested a declaratory judg-
ment that this practice did not infringe Maclean Hunter’s copy-
 
203. See id. at 734. 
204. See id. at 735. 
205. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995). 
206. Id. at 67. 
207. See id. at 63. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. at 64. 
212. See id. 
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right, and the district court granted it summary judgment.213 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s determination 
that the Red Book was not copyrightable.214  Although the district 
court had considered the Red Book’s valuations to be facts, like the 
telephone numbers in Feist, the Second Circuit held that Maclean 
Hunter’s valuations were its original creations because they repre-
sented predictions of future prices estimated for specific geo-
graphic regions, based on numerous considerations and the profes-
sional judgment and expertise of the editors.215  The district court 
had also held that the Red Book’s selection and arrangement were 
not original because they were logical responses to the require-
ments of the vehicle valuation market.216  Reversing the district 
court on this point, Judge Leval explained that “[t]he fact that an 
arrangement of data responds logically to the needs of the market 
for which the compilation was prepared does not negate original-
ity.  To the contrary, the use of logic to solve the problems of how 
best to present the information being compiled is independent crea-
tion.”217  The judge discussed original selection and arrangement in 
combination, and some of the original features he noted could 
properly be considered aspects of either selection or arrangement.  
The features he listed that are best characterized as aspects of se-
lection were the selection of a single approximate and original 
number to represent a model’s valuation within a given region; the 
selection of optional features for inclusion, which included far 
fewer than all possible options; the selection of 5,000 miles, as op-
posed to some other breakpoint, as the increment at which to adjust 
valuations for mileage; the selection of the abstract concept of an 
“average” vehicle in each category as the subject of the valuation; 
and the selection of the number of years’ models to include in the 
book.218 
 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 67-68. 
215. See id. at 67. 
216. See id. 
217. Id. 
218. See id. 
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The Second Circuit again found creative selection in a compi-
lation of terms of venery.219  In Lipton v. Nature Co.,220 James Lip-
ton (“Lipton”) alleged that the defendants had created posters and 
other works that infringed on his copyright in his book, a compila-
tion of nouns.221  Although the defendants argued that the book 
was not copyrightable because the nouns were facts and not Lip-
ton’s original work, the court held that the book was protected be-
cause Lipton’s selection and arrangement were original.222  Based 
on his subjective, informed, and creative judgment, Judge 
Cabranes wrote, Lipton selected the words included in his book 
from numerous variations of hundreds of available terms in fif-
teenth century works.223 
In an opinion that was subsequently vacated, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found creative selection in a publisher’s selection of cable 
television systems in Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data 
Corp.224  Warren Publishing, Inc. (“Warren”) compiled and pub-
lished an annual printed directory of cable systems located 
throughout the United States.225  Entries within each state were ar-
ranged by the name of the principal community each system 
served.226  The book’s group ownership section listed selected 
pieces of information about entities that owned and operated more 
than one cable system.227  Alleging copyright infringement, War-
ren sought and was granted an injunction against Microdos Data 
Corp. (“Microdos”), which published a software package provid-
 
219. Terms of venery are collective nouns for identifying animal groups.  See Lip-
ton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1995). 
220. 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995). 
221. See id. at 468. 
222. See id. at 468, 470. 
223. See id. at 470. 
224. 52 F.3d 950 (11th Cir.), vacated, 67 F.3d 276 (11th Cir. 1995) (granting re-
hearing en banc), remanded, 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). 
225. See Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 951 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
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ing similar cable system information.228 
Affirming the district court, the circuit court held that Warren’s 
selection was sufficiently creative and original to be copyright-
able.229  Warren selected the data it presented about cable systems 
from an external universe of existing information drawn from the 
industry and presented in various forms by other compilers.230  The 
publisher chose to present information by listing cable systems, 
identified according to its own definition of “system.”231  Also, 
Warren selected a method for locating each system within its list-
ings, identifying each system by the name of the principal commu-
nity it served.232  For multiple-community systems, it selected the 
principal community by which to list the system.233  The court 
noted that “the underlying data in this case does not in itself reveal 
that listing will be by principal communities, and, except for sin-
gle-community operations, it does not reveal the name of the prin-
cipal community, which is central to Warren’s selection proc-
ess.”234  The court contrasted Warren’s selection with that in 
Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Information 
Publishing, Inc.235  Unlike Warren, Bellsouth Advertising & Pub-
lishing Corp., the plaintiff in Bellsouth, had used its own data 
rather than select data from external sources.236 
 
228. See id. at 950. 
229. See id. at 955. 
230. See id. at 954. 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
234. Id. 
235. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993). 
236. Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 
1995).  Writing in dissent, Judge Kravitch stated that the case was factually similar to 
Bellsouth, in which the Eleventh Circuit had not found Bellsouth’s selection of business 
listings, geographic area, or directory closing date to be sufficiently creatively original to 
warrant copyright protection.  See id. at 956 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).  Kravitch dis-
cussed how Warren’s selection of principal communities was similar to Bellsouth’s selec-
tion of business listings.  See id. at 957.  Both Warren and Bellsouth selected business 
classifications from a larger universe of available headings.  See id.  Finally, the fact that 
Bellsouth compiled its own data was not sufficient to distinguish it from Warren.  Hinting 
that the majority’s reasoning reintroduced sweat of the brow, Kravitch wrote that “[a] 
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In Budish v. Gordon,237 an Ohio district court found creative 
selection in the selection of data contained in tables in a copy-
righted book on Medicaid planning.238  The book Avoiding the 
Medicaid Trap:  How to Beat the Catastrophic Cost of Nursing-
Home Care (“The Medicaid Trap”)239 included tables based on a 
complex 152-page technical Governor’s Report that presented in-
formation about state requirements and guidelines for Medicaid 
eligibility in most states.240  The defendants published a competing 
Medicaid planning guide containing tables allegedly copied from 
The Medicaid Trap,241 and the book’s author Armond Budish 
(“Budish”) sued for infringement.242  The court determined that the 
tables were protectable expression because Budish had selected 
and arranged the material taken from the Governor’s Report in an 
original manner.243  The selection was original because Budish had 
chosen relevant data and discarded what he felt was unneces-
sary.244  The court stated that “[t]he cluttered tables in the Gover-
nor’s Report appear nothing like Plaintiff’s final Tables, and 
clearly it was Plaintiff’s selectivity that made the difference.” 245 
2. Cases in Which Selections Were Held Not to be 
Creative 
Courts have also rejected claims of creative selection in several 
cases decided since Feist.  Five months after the Feist decision, in 
Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc.,246 the Second 
 
compiler who takes facts from an outside source is not any more original under copyright 
law than a compiler who takes facts from its own files; its employees just may have 
worked harder.”  Id. 
237. 784 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
238. Id. at 1332-33. 
239. ARMOND BUDISH, THE MEDICAID TRAP:  HOW TO BEAT THE CATASTROPHIC 
COST OF NURSING-HOME CARE (rev. 1990) [hereinafter THE MEDICAID TRAP] 
240. See Budish, 84 F. Supp. at 1324-25. 
241. See id. at 1328. 
242. See id. at 1331. 
243. See id. at 1332. 
244. See id. at 1333. 
245. Id. at 1333. 
246. 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s pre-Feist holding that a chart 
containing thirteen months of winning numbers in New York 
City’s illegal “numbers games” was not entitled to copyright pro-
tection.247  Victor Lalli Enterprises’ (“Lalli”) chart contained num-
bers calculated from simple formulae that were used by all pub-
lishers of numbers charts.248  All charts shared the same format for 
displaying their data, and the data themselves did not vary from 
publisher to publisher.249  Lalli’s charts were not protected, accord-
ing to the court, because they did not display the minimal creativity 
required by Feist.250  With regard to selection, the court wrote that 
“Lalli exercises neither selectivity in what he reports nor creativity 
in how he reports it.”251 
About the same time that the Second Circuit denied copyright 
protection to Lalli’s numbers chart, the Sixth Circuit in Sem-Torq, 
Inc. v. K-Mart Corp.252 denied protection to a set of five double-
sided lawn signs on the grounds that the set was not a compila-
tion.253  Although Sem-Torq, Inc. (“Sem-Torq”) arranged the signs 
as a set for store display, they were neither packaged nor sold as a 
set to retailers or to consumers.254  Affirming the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to K-Mart Corporation, the circuit 
court held that the set of signs was no greater than the sum of the 
individual unprotected signs.255  Rather than find that Sem-Torq’s 
selection was not creative, the Sixth Circuit found no selection at 
all.256 
In Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly In-
formation Publishing, Inc.,257 the Eleventh Circuit held that the se-
 
247. See id. at 673. 
248. See id. at 672. 
249. See id. 
250. See id. at 673. 
251. Id. at 673. 
252. 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991). 
253. Id. at 855. 
254. See id. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. 
257. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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lection of a geographic scope and closing date for a yellow pages 
directory was not sufficiently original to deserve copyright protec-
tion.258  Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. (“Bellsouth”) 
published a yellow pages directory organized as an alphabetical list 
of business classifications.259  Each of Bellsouth’s business tele-
phone service subscribers was listed under at least one heading in 
the directory.260  To create sales lead sheets for its own competing 
yellow pages directory, Donnelly Information Publishing, Inc. 
(“Donnelly”) created a computer database using information cop-
ied from Bellsouth’s directory.261 
In an en banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit found that the dis-
trict court had erred in determining that Bellsouth’s acts of selec-
tion merited copyright protection.262  The court noted that in Feist, 
Rural had established a geographic scope and closing date for its 
white pages directory, which the Supreme Court held uncopyright-
able as a matter of law.263  The court also pointed out that every 
collection of facts will have a closing date and, where applicable, a 
geographic range.264  Bellsouth’s acts of selection, which included 
requiring yellow pages subscribers to use its business telephone 
service and employing several marketing techniques to generate 
listings, were not acts of authorship, but rather techniques for dis-
covering information.265  Decisions about the best ways to collect 
information will contribute to any compilation, but those decisions 
are insufficient to protect a compilation.266  According to the court, 
“the Copyright Act . . . affords no shelter to the resourceful, effi-
cient, or creative collector . . . .  The protection of copyright must 
inhere in a creatively original selection of facts to be reported and 
 
258. See id. at 1441. 
259. See id. at 1438. 
260. See id. 
261. See id. at 1438-39. 
262. See id. at 1441. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
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not in the creative means used to discover those facts.”267 
In Mid-America Title Co. v. Kirk,268 the Seventh Circuit held 
that the selection of factual information in a title commitment269 
did not merit copyright protection.270  The selection of facts to in-
clude was not a matter of discretion grounded in the title com-
pany’s personal judgment or taste, but was dictated by convention 
and industry standards.271  All title examiners would have selected 
the same facts.272  Because Mid-America Title Co. was required to 
list every fact that could affect the marketability of a title, the court 
determined that the company was afforded little room for creativity 
in selection and exercise of subjective judgment.273 
Two district courts also failed to find selections creatively 
original.  In Skinder-Strauss Associates v. Massachusetts Continu-
ing Legal Education, Inc.,274 a Massachusetts federal district court 
found that Skinder-Strauss Associates, publisher of a legal direc-
tory, “did not exercise even a minimal degree of creativity in a 
 
267. Id. (emphasis omitted).  Judge Hatchett, writing in dissent, asserted that Bell-
south had performed sufficiently original acts of selection to warrant copyright protec-
tion.  See id. at 1473 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).  First, as in Key Publications, Bellsouth’s 
choice of classified headings was an original selection dissimilar to that in other yellow 
pages.  See id.  Second, the selection of only businesses with business telephone service, 
as opposed to residential telephone service, was also an act of selection contributing to 
originality.  See id. at 1476-77.  The fact that Donnelly, Bellsouth’s competitor, had cho-
sen to accept listings from both residential and business subscribers demonstrated that 
Bellsouth’s choice was not automatic or determined by functional concerns.  See id. at 
1477.  Third, choosing a geographic area was also an original act of selection.  See id. at 
1477-78. 
268. 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 990 (1995). 
269. A title commitment “is an offer to provide a policy of title insurance, which is 
ordinarily subject to all interests which affect title to a piece of property.”  Mid-America 
Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F. Supp. 673, 678 (N.D. Ill. 1994).  Title commitments contain “a 
legal description of the property, the property index number, general taxes on the prop-
erty and their status, mortgages on the property and any information of record with re-
spect to such mortgages and the current owners of record on the property and whether 
they are married.”  Id. 
270. See Mid-America Title, 59 F.3d at 722. 
271. See id. 
272. See id. 
273. See id. at 722-23. 
274. 914 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1995). 
POLIVY.TYP 9/29/2006  4:42 PM 
1998] COPYRIGHT FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS 813 
 
Feistian sense” in selecting only actively practicing Massachusetts 
attorneys and in omitting those who were retired or suspended.275  
The court noted that the selection of other information in the direc-
tory, such as attorney name, address, telephone, and fax numbers, 
likewise, was not original but was rather “determined by forces ex-
ternal to the compiler.”276 
In American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n,277 an Il-
linois district court held that a list of dental procedures did not em-
ploy a creatively original selection because the list was intended to 
be comprehensive.278  According to the court, where there is blind 
inclusion, there cannot be discerning selection.279 
3. Analysis of Creative Selection After Feist 
The Key Publications court stated that “[s]election implies the 
exercise of judgment in choosing which facts from a given body of 
data to include in a compilation.”280  But what is “judgment?”  
These decisions show that courts consider subjective, evaluative 
choices based on the selector’s personal knowledge and experience 
and involving a degree of arbitrariness or uncertainty to be crea-
tively original selections.  In Key Publications, the evaluative 
choice was Wang’s assessment, based on her own familiarity with 
New York City’s Chinese-American community, of which busi-
nesses were likely to remain open and which were likely to disap-
pear quickly.281  The Second Circuit in Nester’s noted that Nester 
selected cross streets and out-of-town destinations to include in his 
guide based on his personal knowledge of New York City and his 
judgment as to their usefulness.282  In CCC Information Services, 
 
275. Id. at 676 (emphasis omitted). 
276. Id. 
277. 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1714 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
278. See id. at 1725. 
279. See id. 
280. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513 
(2d Cir. 1991). 
281. See id. 
282. See Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 735 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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the court emphasized the judgment involved in assigning the 
valuations.283  The court stressed the fact that Maclean Hunter’s 
valuations were the product of its managers’ professional judgment 
and expertise.284  The Lipton court likewise noted that Lipton’s se-
lections were the product of Lipton’s “subjective and informed” 
judgment.285  The subjective element in Warren was the choice to 
organize cable systems by principal community served, along with 
the designation of principal communities.286  Those selections were 
not obvious in the underlying data and represented Warren’s arbi-
trary judgment.  Budish used his years of experience in the field of 
elder law to decide which of the many potentially useful pieces of 
information in the Governor’s Report his readers would find use-
ful.287  Budish’s selections, like Warren’s selection of principal 
communities, were not obvious from looking at the data source.288 
These cases, in which the selections were held to be creatively 
original, contrast sharply with Mid-America Title, Skinder-Strauss 
and American Dental Ass’n, in which creatively original selections 
were held not to exist.  Mid-America’s selection was dictated by 
convention and strict industry standards.289  Skinder-Strauss’ selec-
tion of all actively practicing attorneys in the Massachusetts area 
was “typical” and “garden-variety” in the Feistian sense.290  As a 
comprehensive compilation for which the only principal of selec-
tion was inclusion, American Dental Ass’n clearly did not involve 
creatively original selection.  Bellsouth presents a slightly more 
 
283. See CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (stating that with the selection of “a single number to cover vast regions that 
undoubtedly contain innumerable variations, the Red Book expresse[d] a loose judgment 
that values are likely to group together with greater consistency within a defined region 
than without” and, therefore, the number was “necessarily both approximate and origi-
nal”). 
284. See id. at 66. 
285. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1995). 
286. See Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
287. See Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
288. See id. 
289. See Mid-America Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1995). 
290. See 914 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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difficult case, but it is distinguishable from the cases in which 
courts found selections to be sufficiently creative.  One commenta-
tor suggests that Bellsouth’s selections of a geographic area and 
temporal cutoff were as creative as Wang’s selection of businesses 
in Key Publications.291  Insofar as the opinion reveals, however, 
Bellsouth did not apply a subjective, evaluative rule in selecting its 
geographic area and cutoff date.  Wang’s selections, in contrast, 
reflected her evaluations of the health and stability of various busi-
nesses.  Similarly, Bellsouth’s choice of a geographic area was not 
as creative as Maclean Hunter’s designation of three geographical 
regions in CCC Information Services, because Bellsouth’s choice 
apparently did not reflect any special judgment about the area cho-
sen but was instead a utilitarian decision.  In contrast, Maclean 
Hunter’s selection, like Wang’s, was evaluative. 
The selection cases also evince a distinction between informa-
tive and inevitable selections.  Wang’s selection of businesses con-
veyed the information that she thought those businesses were not 
ephemeral.  Maclean Hunter’s selection of geographic regions rep-
resented a judgment that all the locales within a region shared cer-
tain characteristics in their used car markets.  That is, the selection 
made a statement about those regions, separate from Maclean 
Hunter’s use of those regions to organize its data.  Warren’s selec-
tion of cable systems by community served conveyed information 
as to which community each system served.  None of those selec-
tions were “obvious” from the underlying data.  The Bellsouth 
court, in contrast, termed Bellsouth’s selection “inevitable.”292  
Skinder-Strauss and Mid-America Title resemble Bellsouth in this 
respect. 
The cases also differ with respect to the importance of the se-
lection method as opposed to the ultimate selection of data.  In 
Bellsouth, the Eleventh Circuit stated that originality must inhere 
 
291. See Ethan L. Wood, Note, Copyrighting the Yellow Pages:  Finding Original-
ity in Factual Compilations, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1319, 1334 (1994). 
292. See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g Inc., 999 F.2d 
1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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in the selection itself, not in the methods used to gather data.293  On 
the other hand, the Lipton and Warren courts gave some weight to 
how the compilers had gone about selecting their information.  
Lipton pored over fifteenth century manuscripts.294  Warren se-
lected a method for locating cable systems within its listings.295 
The differing approaches may reflect a doctrinal split among 
the circuits with respect to Professor Raskind’s question whether 
“selection, coordination, and arrangement” are to be read as nouns 
or as verbs identifying creative, intellectual activity.296  In other 
words, should courts focus on the acts of authorship involved in 
creating a compilation, or on the work itself?297  Alternatively, the 
different outcomes may reflect subtle differences in the types of se-
lection methods involved in these cases.  The methods used in 
Bellsouth were marketing techniques directed at mining Bell-
south’s own business data.  The methods in CCC Information Ser-
vices, Lipton, and Warren were subjective evaluations of large 
amounts of external data. 
If courts can consider the source of the data and selection 
method when assessing whether a compilation shows the creative 
spark required for copyright protection, they can introduce sweat 
of the brow.  The focus will not be on the quantity of labor ex-
pended, but on the nature of the effort and its intellectual difficulty 
such that it can be characterized as embodying non-obvious sub-
jective judgments.  Lipton, CCC Information Services, and Warren 
all hint at an intellectual sweat of the brow doctrine, under which 
courts consider not the labor but the intellectual enterprise that 
contributed to an ultimate selection.  Perhaps the true distinction 
between these cases and Bellsouth, then, is that the selection proc-
ess in Bellsouth was not an unguided intellectual exercise but an 
 
293. See id. at 1441. 
294. See Lipton, 71 F.3d at 470 (“In compiling his work, Lipton assembled terms 
from various fifteenth century texts and manuscripts.  They were selected from numerous 
variations of hundreds of available terms.”). 
295. See Warren, 52 F.3d at 954-55. 
296. Raskind, supra note 50, at 334-35. 
297. See id. at 334. 
POLIVY.TYP 9/29/2006  4:42 PM 
1998] COPYRIGHT FOR FACTUAL COMPILATIONS 817 
 
application of business marketing principles. 
B. Creative Arrangement 
The United States Copyright Office defines “arrangement” as 
“the ordering or grouping of data into lists or categories that go be-
yond the mere mechanical grouping of data such as, for example, 
the alphabetical, chronological, or sequential listings of data.”298  
Compilations often are most useful when arranged in common-
place, “inevitable,” or functional ways.  Consequently, establishing 
creative originality in an arrangement may be more difficult than in 
a selection.299  Although courts should, and typically do, analyze 
selection and arrangement separately, they tend to find both or nei-
ther selection and arrangement to be creatively original. 
1. Cases in Which Arrangements Were Held to be 
Creative 
In Key Publications, the Second Circuit found creative origi-
nality in Wang’s decision as to which businesses to include under 
which category.300  Although the format of Key’s directory resem-
bled that of many classified directories, and Key’s categories had 
been used before, some were of special interest to Chinese-
Americans and not commonly found in yellow pages.301  The court 
stated that the individual categories chosen are not relevant to the 
inquiry into creative arrangement.302  Rather, the focus is on 
whether the directory’s arrangement in the aggregate is original.303  
Here, the arrangement was original because it was not mechanical 
but resulted from Wang’s creative decisions as to which businesses 
 
298. See Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 
513 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR 
REGISTRATION OF FACT-BASED COMPILATIONS 1 (rev. Oct. 11, 1989)). 
299. See Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 344-45. 
300. See id. at 514. 
301. See id. 
302. See id. 
303. See id. 
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to include in each category.304 
Although it analyzed selection and arrangement together, the 
Second Circuit in CCC Information Services also found creative 
arrangement in Maclean Hunter’s division of the national used car 
market into three regions for the purpose of estimating used car 
valuations.305 
2. Cases in Which Arrangements Were Held Not to be 
Creative 
In contrast to the courts in Key Publications and CCC Informa-
tion Services, the Bellsouth court held that the arrangement in Bell-
south’s yellow pages was not original but rather was “entirely typi-
cal” for a business telephone directory.306  The Eleventh Circuit 
compared Bellsouth’s directory with other business directories and 
found that Bellsouth had not varied from the standard arrangement, 
which consisted of alphabetical listings of headings describing 
types of businesses, with alphabetical listings of businesses under 
those headings.307  The court also determined that the merger doc-
trine precluded it from finding creative originality in Bellsouth’s 
arrangement, because an examination of other directories showed 
that there was only one way to construct a useful business direc-
tory.308  It is irrelevant that there are other imaginable methods of 
 
304. See id. 
305. See CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 
1994).  The Eleventh Circuit in Warren Publ’g never explicitly analyzed Warren’s ar-
rangement of cable system data but rather found creative originality only in Warren’s se-
lection.  See Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 
1995).  The court, however, should have characterized as arrangement, not selection, the 
fact that Warren had “selected a method for placing each system within the listing struc-
ture; i.e., it chose to identify each system by the geographical name of the principal 
community served.”  Id. at 954.  The underlying data, according to the court, did not on 
its face suggest that it should be listed by principal communities.  Id.  The aspect of War-
ren’s compilation so described meets the United States Copyright Office’s definition of 
arrangement as an ordering of data into a list that goes beyond a mechanical grouping. 
306. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 
1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993). 
307. See id. at 1442 n.13. 
308. See id. at 1442. 
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arrangement, according to the court; what matters is whether the 
compilation at issue shows originality.309  Bellsouth’s heading 
structure itself was not original because some headings were “ob-
vious” and some reflected standard industry practices.310  Also, 
some subscribers chose where to be listed, so placement of their 
listings in categories was not creative.311 
The American Dental Ass’n court held that the arrangement 
was not creative because it was logical and conventional, based on 
standard custom and practice in dentistry.312 
3. Analysis of Creative Arrangement After Feist 
The major question that emerges from the cases that specifi-
cally analyze arrangement is whether the court should focus on the 
particular categories chosen or on the overall format of the work.  
The Second and Eleventh Circuits differ on this issue.  In Key Pub-
lications, the Second Circuit admitted that the directory’s format 
was common to classified directories but found creativity in the 
choice of particular categories and the arrangement of listings un-
der categories.313  In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Bellsouth fo-
cused on the general format of Bellsouth’s arrangement rather than 
its specific features.  Because the heading structure was “entirely 
typical,” the arrangement was not protected.314  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s test effectively raises the threshold of originality higher than 
the Feist standard, by requiring that the general format of a yellow 
pages directory be different from that in other yellow pages direc-
tories.315  Feist stated that originality does not require novelty.  The 
Eleventh Circuit has in effect imposed a novelty requirement on 
original arrangements. 
 
309. See id. at 1443. 
310. Id. at 1444. 
311. See id. 
312. See American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1714, 
1725 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
313. See Wood, supra note 291, at 1335. 
314. Id. at 1334. 
315. See id. at 1337. 
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Another issue is the extent to which an arrangement can re-
spond to market needs and still be creatively original.  In CCC In-
formation Services, the court stated that originality is not negated 
just because an arrangement responds to the needs of the market.316  
Likewise, the arrangement in Budish responded to Budish’s per-
ception of his readers’ needs.  In both of those cases, the particular 
arrangement chosen was one of many possible responses to the 
compiler’s subjective evaluation of the market’s needs.  In con-
trast, the compilations in Bellsouth and American Dental Ass’n 
used arrangements that the respective courts determined had been 
dictated by standard industry practices.  The distinction is that be-
tween a subjective evaluation of market needs and an unquestioned 
industry standard. 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, as construed by Feist, the selec-
tion, arrangement, or coordination of pre-existing materials may 
constitute creative originality sufficient to merit protection.  No 
cases, however, have addressed coordination as an independent 
factor. 
C. Applying the Merger Doctrine to Factual Compilations 
The merger doctrine—the principle that copyright law does not 
protect expression where protection of the expression would effec-
tively grant protection to the idea itself—was not an issue in Feist, 
but has been addressed in subsequent compilation cases. 
1. Factual Compilation Cases Discussing Idea/Expression 
Merger 
In Kregos v. Associated Press,317 the Second Circuit analyzed 
whether the merger doctrine should bar protection of an outcome-
predictive baseball pitching form.  In this case, George Kregos 
(“Kregos”) distributed to newspapers a form containing nine items 
of information about the past performances of opposing pitchers 
 
316. CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
317. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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scheduled to start each day’s games.318  Other pitching forms had 
previously used some of Kregos’ nine items but had grouped them 
differently.319  No form had previously used Kregos’ ninth item.320  
Kregos charged the Associated Press (“AP”) with infringing his 
copyright by publishing a virtually identical form.  The circuit 
court held that it could not determine as a matter of law that the 
form was not copyrightable and reversed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the AP.321 
Judge Newman noted that every compilation merges idea and 
expression in that it expresses its compiler’s idea that a particular 
selection of information is useful.322  Identifying the idea at that 
low level of abstraction would deny copyright to all factual compi-
lations.323  At a higher level of abstraction, merger is not auto-
matic, although in some cases alternative forms of expression may 
be so few as to preclude protecting the idea.324  Newman endorsed 
the district court’s characterization of Kregos’ idea as the idea of 
an outcome predictive pitching form.325  Pointing to variations 
among published pitching forms as evidence of alternative means 
of expression, however, Newman rejected the district court’s de-
termination that such an idea could be expressed in only a limited 
number of ways.326 
 
318. See id. at 702. 
319. See id. 
320. See id. at 703. 
321. Id. at 704.  On remand, the district court held that the Associated Press had not 
infringed.  See Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  The 
Second Circuit court affirmed.  See Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
322. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
325. See id. 
326. See id. at 706-07.  Judge Newman admitted he was uncomfortable about the 
possibility that protecting a selection could in effect protect an idea.  He posited as an 
example a doctor publishing a list of symptoms for diagnosing a disease.  If the doctor’s 
idea was the general one that the disease in question could be identified from observable 
symptoms, then there would not be merger.  But if the doctor’s idea was the narrow one 
that his particular selection of symptoms was useful in identifying the disease, then the 
narrow idea could be expressed only by his list of symptoms and merger would probably 
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According to Judge Newman, “[a]s long as selections of facts 
involve matters of taste and personal opinion, there is no serious 
risk that withholding the merger doctrine will extend protection to 
an idea.”327  Newman added that, “where a selection of data is the 
first step in an analysis that yields a precise result or even a better-
than-average probability of some result, protecting the ‘expression’ 
of the selection would clearly risk protecting the idea of the analy-
sis.”328  Applying this framework, Newman judged Kregos’ form 
to be midway between “pure taste” and predictive analysis.329  
Kregos’ selection of nine items implied that he thought them useful 
in predicting outcomes.330  His form, however, did not provide a 
system for determining the probabilities of particular outcomes.331  
Kregos’ idea remained the general idea that statistics can be used 
to evaluate pitching performance, rather than the narrow idea that 
his selection would predict an outcome.332 
Judge Sweet, writing in dissent, stated that Kregos’ idea was 
the specific one that his nine items were the most important statis-
tics in predicting the outcome of a baseball game.333  According to 
Sweet, if the concept of an outcome-predictive pitching form were 
new, then Kregos’ form might be protected as the detailed expres-
sion of an idea.334  Nevertheless, because other forms with similar 
formats and arrangements existed before Kregos chose his nine 
items, his “creation” was nothing more than the choice of those 
nine statistics, a choice that was inseparable from its idea.335  
 
exist.  Whether merger applies depends on the level of abstraction at which the idea is 
formulated.  See id. at 707. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
329. See id. 
330. See id. 
331. See id. 
332. See id. 
333. See id. at 711 (Sweet, J., dissenting). 
334. See id. 
335. See id.  Interestingly, the majority and dissent drew opposite legal conclusions 
from the fact that Kregos’ form was one of many pitching forms.  When choosing a level 
of abstraction, Newman relied on the existence of other pitching forms to establish that 
Kregos’ form was one of many possible expressions of the idea of an outcome-predictive 
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Sweet distinguished the general idea that a selection of data is use-
ful from the more specific idea that a particular selection of data is 
the most useful possible.336  The less precise idea is expressed in 
compilations that are based on “aesthetic choices,” or those in 
which the compilation’s value rests more on the fact of the compi-
lation than on the worth of the data it contains.337  The narrow idea 
is expressed in compilations having the primary purpose of allow-
ing a reader to reach a “clearly defined goal.”338  Kregos’ form, 
according to Sweet, was of the latter type.339 
The Second Circuit again addressed merger and factual compi-
lations in CCC Information Services.340  CCC asserted that each 
Red Book entry expressed the authors’ idea of a vehicle’s valua-
tion, and that any expression in the Red Book was indispensable to 
the statement of the idea and therefore merged with it and became 
unprotectable.341  In response, Judge Leval stated that the funda-
mental constitutional principle of copyright is to promote the ad-
vance of knowledge by granting authors exclusive rights to their 
writings.342  Copyright provides financial incentives to authors in 
the form of exclusive rights to their writings, allowing authors to 
sell or license their works.343  The merger doctrine limits the scope 
of protection to ensure that ideas remain freely accessible.344  The 
issue before the court exemplified the conflict between these poli-
cies.  If CCC were to prevail in its merger argument, statutory pro-
 
pitching form.  Sweet used the existence of other forms as the basis for his claim that 
Kregos’ expression was no more than the idea that his nine items would best predict the 
outcome of a baseball game.  Sweet also took issue with the majority’s doctor example.  
Both the hypothetical doctor and Kregos developed precise ideas about which data are 
important in predicting a given result, according to Sweet, and the only means of express-
ing those ideas is identifying the relevant data.  See id. 
336. See id. at 714. 
337. See id. 
338. See id. 
339. See id. 
340. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
341. See id. at 68. 
342. See id. 
343. See id. at 68-69. 
344. See id. at 71. 
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tection for compilations would be practically eviscerated because, 
given the nature of the compilations, virtually any independent 
creation as to selection, coordination, or arrangement will be in-
tended to increase the compilation’s usefulness and will represent 
an idea.345  In compilations, these ideas will be expressed simply 
and plainly.346  If the merger doctrine allowed copying the individ-
ual expression of such ideas, section 103 of the Copyright Act 
would no longer protect compilations.347 
Leval characterized the Kregos decision as a policy judgment 
between two evils, the “unbridled” application of merger, which 
would negate copyright protection for compilations, and the com-
plete failure to apply merger, which would protect useful ideas.348  
The Kregos court had chosen the middle path, “a selective applica-
tion of the merger doctrine, withholding its application as to soft 
ideas infused with taste and opinion.”349 
Applying Kregos’ approach to the case at hand, Leval stated 
that merger should be withheld as a matter of copyright policy.350  
Because CCC took the entire compilation and the valuations taken 
were opinion statements rather than facts, giving CCC the benefit 
of the merger doctrine would destroy the protection intended by 
the Copyright Act and “largely vitiate the inducements offered by 
the copyright law to the makers of original useful compilations,” 
without sufficiently benefiting the policy of public access.351 
2. Analysis of Merger Doctrine and Factual Compilations 
First, both Kregos and CCC Information Services indicate that 
merger will not be applied to bar protection of “soft” ideas reflect-
ing “taste and personal opinion.”352  The merger cases thus rein-
 
345. See id. at 70. 
346. See id at 70. 
347. See id. 
348. See id. at 72. 
349. Id. 
350. See id. at 72. 
351. See id. at 73. 
352. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707; CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 71. 
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force the post-Feist emphasis on protecting subjective, evaluative 
judgments that is also reflected in courts’ analysis of creative se-
lection and arrangement. 
Second, Kregos indicates that the more general or imprecise 
the idea of a compilation, the more likely that there will be many 
ways to express it.353  Conversely, precise ideas can be expressed 
in very few ways, so the merger doctrine will preclude their protec-
tion.  A general idea, however, may be expressed as a comprehen-
sive compilation, and the designation of that comprehensive uni-
verse might be considered an idea and thus unprotectable.354  Such 
a decision would seem likely on policy grounds.  According to 
Professor Ginsburg, “idea” is a legal conclusion derived from 
courts’ idea of appropriate competition.355  Courts will label as 
“ideas” aspects of works that they are reluctant to protect because 
they do not want to preclude or raise the costs of other authors’ ef-
forts.356  Because granting copyright protection to the designation 
of a compiler’s universe would prevent others from producing 
competing compilations dealing with the same universe, courts 
would probably apply the “idea” label to the universe. 
Third, the balancing approach adopted in CCC Information 
Services allows courts to ameliorate the perceived harshness of the 
Feist rule and reintroduce sweat of the brow through competing 
policy judgments.  The CCC Information Services court’s charac-
terization of the merger doctrine as a tool for balancing the com-
peting policy considerations of author incentives and free access to 
ideas exactly matches Ginsburg’s characterization of “idea” as a 
legal conclusion applied to works that courts are reluctant to pro-
tect.  When application of the merger doctrine would deny protec-
tion to a compilation that, in the court’s view, deserves protection, 
and when withholding merger would not harm the public interest 
in free access to ideas, the court will withhold it.  The very fact that 
courts are called upon to balance these interests makes it possible 
 
353. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707. 
354. Ginsburg II, supra note 129, at 346. 
355. See id. 
356. See id. 
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for them to deem some compilations more deserving of protection 
than others.  Judge Leval’s proposed rule that merger should be 
withheld for compilations involving “soft ideas infused with taste 
and opinion” leaves room for considerable judicial discretion.  
Courts can use balancing to withhold merger to reward compilers 
who invested significant effort in their work. 
D. The Scope of Protection Provided by Compilation 
Copyrights 
Under Feist, copyright affords only “thin” protection to factual 
compilations.357  So long as the selection and arrangement are not 
copied, compilers are free to use the facts contained in other com-
pilations.358  This section discusses how the courts have deter-
mined whether a factual compilation infringes on another’s selec-
tion and arrangement. 
1. Factual Compilation Cases Analyzing Infringement 
Only Key Publications extensively addressed infringement of a 
creative selection.  Although the court in Key Publications might 
have interpreted Feist to permit a finding of infringement only 
when a second-comer produces an exact copy of a protected com-
pilation, the court refused to do so.359  For compilations, the sub-
 
357. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).  The Court ruled that: 
Where the compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the 
facts speak for themselves, the expressive element is more elusive.  The only 
conceivable expression is the manner in which the compiler has selected and 
arranged the facts.  Thus, if the selection and arrangement are original, these 
elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection.  No matter how 
original the format, however, the facts themselves do not become original 
through association.  This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual com-
pilation is thin. 
Id. at 349. 
358. See id. at 349. 
359. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 
(1991).  The court stated that: 
We have not read Feist in such a broad and self-defeating fashion.  Such a read-
ing of Feist would allow subsequent compilers to avoid infringement suits sim-
ply by adding a single fact to a verbatim copy of the copyrighted compilation, 
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stantial similarity test is narrowed.  To prove infringement, the 
compiler must show substantial similarity between the particular 
elements of the compilation that provide copyrightability.360 
Applying this principle to the selection aspect of the Key direc-
tory, the court held that Galore’s directory did not infringe as a 
matter of law.361  Judge Winter reasoned that a finite number of 
businesses are of special interest to the New York Chinese-
American community, so that significant overlap among business 
directories created for that community is inevitable.362  The key is-
sue, according to Winter, is not whether one directory overlaps 
with or copies from another, but whether the organizing principle 
guiding the selection is substantially similar.363  Winter did not 
identify the organizing principles used in the Key or Galore direc-
tories, but instead compared the numbers of entries in the two that 
overlapped or differed.  Galore’s selection of businesses in fact dif-
fered significantly from that in the Key directory.  The Galore 
book did not contain 7,500 of Key’s 9,000 businesses.  The copied 
listings were not taken from a single section of the Key book, but 
were scattered throughout the directory.  In addition, more than 
500 businesses listed in Galore’s directory were not in Key’s.364  
Based on this quantitative analysis, Winter concluded that the or-
ganizing principles the two directories used were not the same.365  
In contrast, if Galore had exactly replicated a substantial portion of 
the Key directory, such as all its listings of professionals, an in-
fringement claim would have succeeded.366 
 
or omitting in the copy a single fact contained in the copyrighted compilation.  
Such a result would render the copyright of a compilation meaningless.  While, 
as the Court pointed out in Feist, the “copyright in a factual compilation is 
thin,” we do not believe it is anorexic. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
360. See id. 
361. Id. at 515-16. 
362. Id. at 516. 
363. Id. 
364. See id. 
365. See id. 
366. See id. at 517. 
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Ironically, the court warned Key that, having prevailed on its 
copyright claim even though it had copied some listings from the 
earlier Restaurant Directory, it could not protect itself from Ga-
lore’s similarly copying some entries from it.367  This warning em-
phasizes the weak level of protection in a compilation copyright.  
To the extent that a compilation borrows from a single source, that 
compilation is vulnerable to another compilation’s borrowing from 
it. 
With respect to arrangement, Winter also concluded that Ga-
lore had not infringed.368  Galore’s arrangement was facially unlike 
Key’s.  While Key used more than 260 categories, Galore used 
only 28, with only 3 of those having appeared in Key’s direc-
tory.369  Although many of the listings duplicated across the two 
categories were contained in similar categories in both directories, 
the court stated that the arrangement of categories was to be distin-
guished from the placement of a listing in a particular category, 
which “is the sort of mechanical task that does not merit copyright 
protection.”370 
The remaining compilation cases reaching the infringement is-
sue have applied Key Publications’ approach.  For example, the 
district court in Nester’s determined that Hagstrom had infringed 
because its list of cross streets, though just a subset of Nester’s, 
was based entirely on Nester’s selection.371  On the other hand, the 
court found no infringement as to Nester’s mileage rate guide be-
cause calculations of distances between New York City and par-
ticular destinations were facts derived from destinations and hence 
not copyrightable.372  Though Nester’s selection of particular des-
tinations was copyrightable, Hagstrom’s list of destinations dif-
 
367. See id. at 516. 
368. See id. at 515. 
369. See id. 
370. See id.  It is difficult to square this statement with the court’s earlier determina-
tion that Wang’s creative decisions about placing businesses within categories conferred 
copyrightability on the Key directory’s arrangement. 
371. Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729, 734 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
372. See id. at 735. 
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fered significantly from Nester’s with respect to the facts listed and 
their selection and arrangement.373 
The Lipton court found that the scarf from which the defen-
dants claimed to have copied their terms of venery replicated Lip-
ton’s selection almost exactly.374  Likewise, the Budish court held 
that the tables of Medicaid information in the defendants’ book 
were substantially similar to those in Budish’s book.375  Similarly, 
the Warren court held that Microdos had infringed Warren’s selec-
tion based on the substantial similarity between Microdos’ and 
Warren’s selection of principal communities.376 
2. Analysis of Infringement Issues Raised by Factual 
Compilation Cases 
The principal question that arises with respect to infringement 
is exactly what Judge Winter meant when he stated that the key is-
sue is the substantial similarity of the organizing principles guiding 
the selections in two compilations.  Although other courts have 
paid lip service to Winter’s approach, neither Winter himself nor 
any judge since has enunciated the organizing principles of the fac-
tual compilations at issue.  Rather, courts have employed a quanti-
tative approach, looking at the amount of copied material versus 
the amount of material that differs between the works in question.  
There appears to be no basis other than the amount of material cop-
ied for assessing whether the organizing principles in two compila-
tions are similar or different.  If that is the case, the idea of com-
paring organizing principles serves merely to obscure the analysis. 
E. The Persistence of the Sweat of the Brow Doctrine 
Despite Feist’s affirmation of the creative originality doctrine, 
 
373. See id. 
374. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995).  Seventy-two of the 77 
terms in the book appeared on the scarf, which included only one term not in the book.  
Several translation errors appearing in Lipton’s book appeared on the scarf.  See id. 
375. Budish v. Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, 1333-34 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
376. Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
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courts persist in emphasizing the effort expended in creating com-
pilations.  Two courts have equated effort with originality.  An-
other has introduced a balancing approach to the merger doctrine, 
which, in effect, invites courts to consider rewarding effort after 
finding a compilation to be creatively original. 
1. Cases Invoking Sweat of the Brow by Another Name 
Faced with Feist’s flat rejection of sweat of the brow, courts 
have in effect invoked the doctrine under the rubric of originality.  
In U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham, Inc.,377 
the Fourth Circuit, an “unaligned” circuit before Feist, held that 
U.S. Payphone’s (“Payphone”) guidebook to the coin-operated 
telephone market was copyrightable.  The district court had found 
that “[t]he Guide . . . [was] the result of hundreds of hours of re-
viewing, analyzing, and interpreting state tariffs and regulations of 
the fifty states and the District of Columbia.”378  In addition, the 
court noted that “Payphone produced 2700 pages of documents re-
lating to the review, selection, coordination and arrangement of the 
compiled data which ultimately it organized in a ‘simple and read-
able format’ of fifty-one pages.”379  Based on these findings, the 
appellate court held that Payphone’s selection and organization of 
the material met the minimal standard for creative originality 
enunciated in Feist.380 
More recently, in Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith 
Corp.,381 the Seventh Circuit, a sweat of the brow circuit before 
Feist, clearly invoked sweat of the brow in the guise of originality 
after Feist.  The court held that the ingredient lists in recipes con-
tained in a cookbook holding a compilation copyright were not 
protectable because they were statements of fact.382  Furthermore, 
the directions for combining ingredients were not protectable be-
 
377. 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2049 (4th Cir. 1991). 
378. Id. at 2050. 
379. Id. at 2050-51. 
380. See id. at 2051. 
381. 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
382. See id. at 480. 
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cause they were procedures or processes.383  Discussing the basic 
principles of compilation copyrights, the court cited Feist for the 
proposition that “[t]he creative energies that an author may inde-
pendently devote to the arrangement or compilation of facts may 
warrant copyright protection for that particular compilation.”384  
This proposition focuses on the effort involved in creating the 
compilation, not the creativity of the result.385  Furthermore, the 
court stated that “a compilation’s originality flows from the efforts 
of ‘industrious collection’ by its author.”386  For this principle the 
court cited Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,387 which in turn 
had cited Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publish-
ing,388 the seminal case describing the sweat of the brow theory.389  
In Feist, O’Connor identified Jeweler’s Circular as a case that 
misunderstood the 1909 statute and applied the sweat of the brow 
doctrine.390 
Unlike the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Second Circuit 
clearly subscribed to the creative selection doctrine before Feist.  
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit’s CCC Information Services deci-
sion also hints at the re-emergence of the sweat of the brow ap-
proach.  As discussed above, the balancing approach suggested by 
the CCC Information Services court opens a trapdoor through 
which other courts may sneak in sweat of the brow considerations.  
Moreover, the reintroduction of sweat of the brow is evident when 
CCC Information Services’s and Feist’s characterizations of basic 
copyright principles are compared. 
In CCC Information Services, the court named as the funda-
mental principle of copyright “promot[ing] the advance of knowl-
edge by granting authors exclusive rights to their writings.”391  In 
 
383. See id. at 481. 
384. Id. at 480 
385. See id. at 480. 
386. Id. 
387. 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977). 
388. 281 F. 83, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1922). 
389. See Meade, supra note 40, at 249. 
390. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991). 
391. CCC Info. Servs. V. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 
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contrast, the Feist Court said that “[t]he primary objective of copy-
right is not to reward the labor of authors but ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”392  Selective application of 
merger, according to CCC Information Services, allows courts to 
balance the competing policies of incentives to authors and free 
access to ideas.393  But Feist said in no uncertain terms that others 
may build freely on the fruit of a compiler’s labor.394 
2. Analysis of Hidden Sweat of the Brow Doctrine Cases 
By equating mere effort with creative originality, the U.S. Pay-
phone and Publications Int’l decisions threaten to undermine the 
doctrine espoused in Feist and establish precedents that will con-
fuse other courts.  In contrast, the Second Circuit’s explicit balanc-
ing of copyright’s competing policies in CCC Information Services 
is less pernicious, even though it creates an entry point for the 
sweat of the brow doctrine.  As a policy matter, it is desirable for 
courts to have authority to selectively apply sweat of the brow in 
the limited number of situations in which the equities of the situa-
tion mandate its use and the facts suggest no good policy reason 
for withholding it. 
Professor Raskind suggests that before Feist, the sweat of the 
brow doctrine allowed courts to “engraft[ ] acceptable commercial 
norms onto traditional copyright analysis.”395  He predicts that 
courts will “continue to be moved by an equitable sense of ‘fair’ 
commercial conduct and by an abhorrence of ‘piracy.’”396  If he is 
correct—and the three decisions discussed here suggest that he 
is—the Second Circuit’s forthright balancing of interests is far 
preferable to the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ back-door approach.  
The CCC Information Services approach does not redefine origi-
nality as something other than what the Feist court intended it to 
 
1994) (emphasis added). 
392. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349. 
393. CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 73. 
394. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353-54. 
395. See Raskind, supra note 50, at 332. 
396. Id. 
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be.  Rather, it suggests that in certain situations, additional consid-
erations may be added to the mix.  Instead of diluting the concept 
of creative originality, this approach encourages courts to adhere 
faithfully to Feist’s teachings as an initial matter.  Only after find-
ing creative originality in a compilation might a court entertain al-
ternative policy considerations. 
F. Summary of Factual Compilation Cases After Feist 
The factual compilation cases decided since Feist demonstrate 
that the doctrine of creative originality guides courts to reward 
compilers who do not simply repackage pre-existing information in 
predictable ways but who add content, in the form of useful subjec-
tive evaluations, to unprotectable facts.  The post-Feist cases indi-
cate that subjective, arbitrary judgments are generally protected, 
while objective, predictable decisions are not.  Specifically, courts 
are more likely to protect selections and arrangements that reflect 
compilers’ subjective judgments or evaluations than to protect 
those that respond to routine business requirements.  Courts tend 
not to find creative selection or arrangement when the compiler’s 
choices are “inevitable” or circumscribed by convention, industry 
standards, or other external limitations. 
Nevertheless, as long as they embody an element of subjective 
judgment, compilations can respond to market needs and still be 
held creatively original.  Similarly, courts will withhold 
idea/expression merger if the idea inherent in a compilation is 
“soft” and “infused with taste and opinion.”  In contrast, if the idea 
purports to represent a precise or definite prediction or statement 
about the world, application of the merger doctrine will bar protec-
tion. 
Copyright protection for compilations, if granted, is thin “but 
not anorexic.”  Proving infringement requires showing substantial 
similarity between the particular copyrightable elements of the first 
work and those same elements in the allegedly infringing work.  
Substantial similarity between the principles of selection used, in-
ferred from an analysis of the quantity of information reproduced, 
determines whether a work infringes another’s creative selection. 
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Finally, courts persist in applying the sweat of the brow doc-
trine by equating effort with originality or subtly changing Feist’s 
characterizations of basic copyright principles. 
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CONCLUSION 
The tension between copyright law’s competing policies of 
public dissemination and author incentives is keenly felt in the area 
of factual compilations.  Feist—which held that copyright protects 
only the creatively original aspects of a compilation’s selection, 
coordination, or arrangement—promotes progress in the form of 
enhancements to factual data while encouraging compilers to use 
public domain information freely.  Nevertheless, Feist’s insistence 
on originality as a constitutional requirement for copyright raises 
questions about the scope of Congress’s authority to protect factual 
compilations.  Moreover, the accuracy of Justice O’Connor’s his-
torical characterization of the originality requirement is question-
able. 
The factual compilation cases decided since Feist have eluci-
dated the concepts of creative selection and arrangement.  Courts 
consider the compiler’s subjective, evaluative selections that are 
grounded in the compiler’s personal knowledge and experience 
and are not inevitable or purely utilitarian to be creative.  Several 
courts have applied an intellectual sweat of the brow doctrine, con-
sidering the creativity of the compiler’s selection method and re-
warding those who exerted considerable intellectual effort.  Crea-
tive arrangement is less clearly defined than creative selection, in 
that courts disagree on whether to focus on the particular catego-
ries chosen or the overall format of the work.  Arrangements dic-
tated by standard industry practices are not creative, although an 
arrangement may respond to market needs and still be creative. 
The merger doctrine will bar protection of selections that are 
starting points for predictive analyses, but will not prevent protec-
tion of “soft” ideas based on personal judgments.  Merger may be 
withheld as a policy matter in particular cases if it would vitiate au-
thor incentives while insufficiently serving the policy of public ac-
cess.  Additionally, copyright provides only thin protection for fac-
tual compilations.  Courts analyzing infringement have focused on 
the amount of copied material contained in the works in question. 
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Last, Feist’s disavowal of the sweat of the brow doctrine has 
not prevented courts from applying the doctrine in other guises.  
By protecting intellectual and creative selection methods and bal-
ancing competing policies when analyzing idea/expression merger, 
courts have re-introduced sweat of the brow alongside Feist’s re-
quirement of creative originality.  Two cases have gone farther and 
directly undermined Feist by equating effort with originality.  The 
stubborn persistence of sweat of the brow, despite Feist’s insis-
tence that copyright should not reward effort alone, suggests a 
strong judicial inclination to reward effort and give primacy to 
copyright’s incentive role. 
